This paper marshals a variety of evidence in considering the degree of equity in the U.S. government's treatment of children vis-a-vis adults, particularly the elderly. We begin by showing that poverty rates among American children have increased dramatically over the past two decades, while those of the elderly have fallen. Next, we show that during the same period, consumption and income levels among the elderly have risen relative to those of other Americans, including children.
I. Introduction
This paper examines the U.S. government's current and prospective fiscal treatment of American children from the perspective of transfer payments now being received and government services now being purchased on their behalf. It also considers the benefits and services today's children will receive as well as the taxes they will pay in their adult years.
In examining the transfer payments and services that the current generation of children will receive and the taxes they will pay over their lifetimes, we seek to answer the question, "Are today's children being treated equitably compared with other generations, particularly the current elderly?" Our answer relies in part on a new method of comparing the lifetime net tax burdens (taxes paid less transfers received) of different generations.
This method, called generational accounting, overcomes the Wiculty encountered with point-in-time comparisons between any two generations, namely, that each is at a different stage of the life cycle.
To understand this problem, consider a country with a long-standing policy of financing transfer payments to children through taxes on the elderly. While a point-intime, say time-t, comparison of the treatment of children versus their elders would suggest that children are being treated relatively favorably, it ignores the fact that the time-t elderly received the same amount of transfers when they were children, and that the time-t children will pay the same amount of taxes as the time-t elderly when they are old. Thus, from a lifetime perspective, the time-t children in this example are being treated neither better nor worse than the time-t elderly. In contrast to current-flow accounting, generational accounting, when applied in this hypothetical setting, documents the equal lifetime treatment of the time-t children and elderly. It thus provides a useful tool for comparing the fiscal treatment of different generations despite their being at various stages of the life cycle. Section I1 begins by pointing out that poverty rates among American children have increased steadily over the past two decades, while those of the elderly have fallen. The paper then documents the concomitant rise in the income and consumption levels of older generations relative to younger generations, including children. Finally, we look at the government's role in altering the living standards of children vis-h-vis the elderly. Our results show that much of the current plight of America's youngest citizens is traceable not to a lack of government financial support, but to the breakup of the family unit, which has left almost one-quarter of the nation's children dependent on just one parent.
While section II's discussion of demographics provides some perspective on the limits of government policy in determining the living standards of children, the question remains as to whether the government has offset or exacerbated the relative economic situation of today's children. The rest of the paper considers this question from both a point-in-time and a lifetime perspective. Section III examines the current flows of transfer payments and services being provided to children and compares them with those going to senior citizens. Section IV presents the generational accounting approach to examining the lifetime net tax treatment of different generations. In particular, we compare the lifetime net tax rates of each generation of males and females who were born or who will be bornh this century. A generation's lifetime net tax rate is defined as the ratio of its lifetime net tax payment to its lifetime labor earnings. Lifetime tax rates for different' generations are calculated based on a continuation of current fiscal policy as well as under alternative policies. Section V summarizes the main findings of the paper and presents our conclusions.
The Relative Economic Condition of America's Children
A. Poverty Rates among Children and the Elderly Nearly 13 million American children are currently living in p~verty.~ About 35 percent of these children are black and at least 20 percent are Hispanic. This translates into a child poverty rate of nearly one in five overall, two in five for black households, and more than one in three for Hispanic households.
The 20 percent aggregate child-poverty rate, however, tells us only about the fraction of children who are poor at a particular point in time. It does not indicate the percentage of those who were poor in the past or who will be poor in the future. Since there is considerable mobility of children into and out of states of poverty, one can surmise that more than 20 percent of American children will experience one or more such spells before reaching their eighteenth birthday. Indeed, calculations by Ellwood (1988) , based on panel data, indicate that more than one-third of the children born around 1970 experienced some years of poverty before reaching age 10.
As figure 1 shows, childhood poverty has been increasing steadily over the last two decades. In 1970, only 15 percent of American children were classified as impoverished. 
B. Demoma~hics and Child Poverty
The difference in poverty trends between the young and old raises the question of equity in the government's treatment of children vis-A-vis the elderly. However, other factors clearly seem to be at play, at least as regards higher child poverty rates. One of the most important of these is the increase in the fraction of American children living with only one parent. In 1989,73.1 percent of all U.S. children, including 67.0 percent of Hispanic children and 38.0 percent of black children, lived with both parents. The respective figures for 1970 were considerably higher at 85.2 percent, 77.7 percent, and 5 8.5 p e r~e n t .~ Not surprisingly, child poverty rates are much greater among single-parent households than in two-parent households. Currently, almost 50 percent of children living with one parent are poor, compared to only 10 percent of those living in intact homes. All told, about two in every three poor children come from single-parent families.
The increase in the fraction of children living with only one parent can be traced to two factors: the rising divorce rate and the increasing share of children born out of wedlock. Today, close to 13 percent of Americans age 35 to 44 are divorced, up from 2.9 percent in 1960.4 As a consequence, two children in five now grow up in broken homes.5
Concern about children living in single-parent homes would be mitigated if the absent partner were a frequent visitor, but quite often this turns out not to be the case.
According to a recent survey, almost one-quarter of divorced fathers had no contact with their children in the previous five years and another 20 percent had not seen their children during the preceding year.6
The increase in the fraction of children born to unmanied women since 1970 is even more dramatic than the increase in the divorce rate. In 1970, just over 10 percent of children were born to unwed mothers. By 1990, that figure had topped 25 percent --an explosion that transcends race. In the case of whites, the 1970 share of births to unwed mothers was 6 percent. By 1988, that 
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A Point-in-Time Perspective
A. Flows of Transfers and Taxes by Age and Sex
The last section documented the decline over the last 20 years in the economic well-being of children relative to the elderly. This section asks whether the government (federal, state, and local) has offset or worsened that trend. One way to approach this question is to consider the taxes paid and the direct transfers received by different age groups.
To that end, tables 1 and 2 present these values for various age-sex groups for the years 1970 and 1990. The tables are constructed using cross-section profiles of relative transfer receipts and tax payments by age and sex in order to distribute aggregate transfers and taxes according to those two demographic characteristics. As described in Auerbach, The elderly do, however, pay out much more in taxes than do children, even if one imputes sales and excise tax payments to children. For instance, in 1990 the average tax 70ne aspect of the tables that may seem anomalous is the excise tax payments imputed to children. These taxes represent the payment of sales and excise taxes on goods and services purchased for children by their parents. Admittedly, a case could be made for imputing these payments to the parents.
payment was $7,412 for 70-year-old women, but only $799 for 10-year-old girls. If one subtracts these transfers from the taxes paid, the resulting net payment figures still show an enormous difference in the flow of income from the government to the elderly versus children.
B. Flows of Age-Related Government Services
The flows of transfers and taxes just considered do not provide a complete picture of the annual flow of economic resources between the government and the private sector.
The main omission is the flow of services provided directly by the government as a consequence of its purchases of goods and services. These services are wide-ranging and include items such as the protection afforded by national defense spending, reduction of travel time and transportation costs arising fiom federal, state, and local road systems, provision of public education, and the general knowledge that has filtered down from the space program. Unfortunately, with the exception of educational expenditures (which in the main benefit children), government purchases consist of public goods, whose advantages cannot be ascribed to particular generations or groups within generations.
Be that as it may, educational expenditures are still worth considering because they are so large. In 1990, combined education purchases for elementary education by federal, In sum, if one ignores the fact that children and the elderly are at different stages of their life cycles --and thus can be expected to receive different treatment by the government --one can make a strong case that children are getting the short end of the stick.
IV. The Government's Treatment of Children Relative to Other Age Groups --
A Lifetime Perspective
While the flow figures are striking, ignoring the fact that children and the elderly are at different stages of their life cycles seems clearly inappropriate. Does it make sense, for example, to claim that the current elderly are being treated better than current children because they generally receive large Social Security benefits? Such an assertion ignores, among other things, the fact that the current elderly did not receive much in the way of Social Security benefits when they were children, and that today's children will receive larger Social Security benefits when they are old.
By controlling for the life cycle, generational accounts can help us to assess the true degree of generational equity underlying government policy. Generational accounts indicate, in present value, the average net taxes that members of a generation can expect to pay over their remaining lives. The generational account at birth of a given cohort is particularly interesting, as it indicates the average present value of the net taxes the generation's members will pay to the government over their entire life spans. This notion of equity --that each cohort's lifetime generational account should equal zero --carries over to the case in which both government purchases and productivity growth are zero, but there is positive population growth. In this scenario, future generations are obviously more numerous, but setting each one's lifetime account to zero ensures that members of each generation will bear the same fiscal burden --namely, zero. Now let's add government purchases to our hypothetical economy, but assume that these are of no value to any generation. In this case, equitable treatment would mandate setting each generation's lifetime account to the same positive value, where this amount is determined such that the present value of all lifetime generational accounts of all current and future generations pays for the present value of government purchases.
Next take the case where government purchases do provide services of positive value to some earlier generations, but where all such purchases occurred in the past.
Further, suppose that the generations who received these benefits were not required to pay for them. This means that existing and future generations would have to pick up the tab.g Equity in this context again mandates setting each current and future generation's lifetime account equal to the same positive value --once again the amount needed to pay off, in present value, the bill these generations inherit collectively. The same situation would arise if the bill bequeathed to current and future generations were not for past government services enjoyed by older generations, but rather for past net transfers made to them.9 gThk bill might, for example, be presented to current and future generations in the form of official government debt. gThe initiation of an unfunded "pay-as-you-go" Social Security system is one example of a situation in which current and future generations are forced to pay for tmufers to a previous generation, namely, the one that is old when the system is initiated. This start-up generation receives Social Security benefits without ever having paid Social Security taxes. As a consequence, later generations are forced, when young, to make contributions to a system that provides them with less old-age income than they would have earned had they been free to invest that money privately. The lower-than-market rate of retum that Finally, suppose government purchases do provide services of value to current as well as future generations. Here, equitable government policy would involve 1) providing each generation with the same level of services, and 2) making each generation pay the same amount for these services (i.e., setting the lifetime accounts of all generations at the same positive amount needed to cover, in present value, the government's spending).
Thus far, we have argued that generationally equitable fiscal policy entails equal lifetime accounts for all generations. But this prescription becomes less clear once we alter our assumptions to include positive productivity growth. In this case, generations born in the future will have higher lifetime incomes than those currently alive. If government policy is intended to equalize the welfare of all generations, it must find a means to redistribute, on an ongoing basis, from as-yet unborn generations toward those currently alive. As suggested above, the available mechanism is to set the lifetime accounts of earlier generations at lower values (not necessarily positive values) than those of later generations. As can easily be shown, such a policy requires the government to set successive generations' lifetime accounts equal to a larger and larger fraction of their lifetime incomes. In other words, the lifetime tax rate, or the ratio of a generation's lifetime account to the present value of the income it earns over its entire life span, must approach 100 percent asymptotically. lo While positive productivity growth coupled with the goal of equalizing each generation's after-tax lifetime income means that today's children should face higher lifetime tax rates than today's adults, including the current elderly, the goal of perfect equality of welfare across generations is not sacrosanct. Society may view different intergenerational distributions of after-tax income as equitable, even though these do not entail perfect equality of after-tax lifetime income. For example, society may consider the higher levels of productivity that future generations will enjoy as their natural inheritance. Since the allocation of taxes between husbands and wives within marriages is, admittedly, somewhat arbitrary, table 3 also reports lifetime net tax rates for males and females together, calculated as a weighted average of the net tax rate for each sex. Note that in this case the average net tax rate rises significantly over time, from 21.5 percent for the generation born in 1900 to 33.5 percent for the generation born in 199 1. Table 3 also reports gross tax and transfer rates. To calculate these, the present value of a generation's lifetime taxes (or transfers) is divided by the present value of its labor income. This breakdown reveals the growth of government transfer payments during this century. The lifetime transfer rate for males and females taken together nearly quadrupled between 1900 and 1991, rising from 3.3 percent to 12.2 percent. The increase was more rapid, in both relative and absolute terms, for those generations born before World War 11 than for those born afterward.
Because of the need to pay for the higher gross transfers as well as government purchases, the gross tax rate has also risen markedly in the past two decades. This is in contrast to the net tax rate, which has stayed fairly constant. The gross tax rate for males and females together is 24.8 percent for the generation born in 1900 versus 45.8 percent for the generation born in 1991. . .
rabons Net Tax C o n t n m
The only figures in table 3 that have not yet been discussed are the lifetime net tax rates to be paid by future generations. These rates are derived assuming a currentservices projection of the future fiscal treatment of existing generations. Specifically, we add together the remaining (as opposed to lifetime) generational accounts of all existing generations to arrive at the collective net tax contribution they will have to make to pay off the government's existing net debt (gross debt minus gross assets) as well as the present value of its future purchases. By subtracting this contribution from the sum of the government's net debt and the present value of its purchases, we arrive at the presentvalue amount that future generations will have to pay collectively if current fiscal policies are maintained.
We transform the aggregate present-value fiscal burden to be imposed on future generations into a per capita amount by factoring in projections of future population growth and then assuming that each person born in the future pays the same amount after adjustment for economic growth. The growth adjustment assumes that, on average, members of each successive generation pay l+g times the average amount paid by members of the previous generation, where g is the assumed rate of growth. The amount future generations will pay over their lifetimes divided by their projected future lifetime income provides our estimate of their lifetime net tax rate.
As indicated in table 3, unless either existing Americans are made to pay more on net over their remaining years or government purchases are reduced, future citizens w i l l be faced with lifetime net tax rates of 7 1 percent --more than twice the rate projected for those born in 1991 (again based on current services). Of course, the assumption that existing generations, including those born in 1991, will pay no more than the amount suggested by current-services projections is just that --an assumption. It is made not because it mirrors reality, but rather to illustrate the extent of the imbalance in U.S.
generational policy. As we discuss in the next subsection, other assumptions about the evolution of future U.S. fiscal policy, specifically those that place a larger burden on existing generations, lead to lower lifetime net tax rates for future generations, albeit at the price of higher rates for those currently living, particularly today's children.
E. Generational Accounting's Meabout the Demee of Eauity in U.S,
The figures in table 3 indicate that current American children will be burdened with much higher lifetime net tax rates than the current elderly. The generation born in 1991, for example, could face a 27 percent larger lifetime net tax rate than that facing Americans born in 1920. This projected discrepancy would be ~i~c a n t l y exacerbated by any change in U.S. fiscal policy aimed at preventing future generations from paying more than 70 percent of their lifetime income to the government. contributions might suggest that a lower lifetime tax rate for the current elderly is in order.
Third, the steep increase in lifetime tax rates may be justified to the extent that society's notion of generational equity entails equalizing the after-tax lifetime earnings of current and future generations.
If, however, society's idea of generational fairness means extracting an equal proportional sacrifice from every generation, then the numbers in tables 3 and 4 must be viewed (ignoring differences in public goods and special contributions) as highly discomforting. They show a trajectory of U.S. generational policy that will force today's children to bear a much larger burden than today's elderly ever had to (or ever will have to). And the picture for tomorrow's children is even bleaker.
Regardless of how one views the numbers in tables 3 and 4, it is worth pointing out that they probably understate the generational differences in economic well-being generated by U.S. fiscal policy. Lower saving means lower investment, which in turn means that the U.S. capital stock will grow at a slower rate than the work force. Since labor productivity depends on the amount of capital available per worker, and since real U.S. wages reflect the nation's labor productivity, the decline in saving is responsible for lowering real wage growth. It is also responsible for raising the real return to capital, since it has made capital scarce relative to labor, the other factor of production. Those who have been most harmed by slower real wage growth are today's young and middle-aged workers, who have seen their real hourly pay pick up very slowly over the past two decades. If the low rate of U.S.
saving continues, today's children will also experience minimal growth in their real wages once they enter the work force. Since the late 1970s, on the other hand, the real return to capital has been quite high. This is an important point because the foremost beneficiaries have been today's elderly, the primary holders of U.S. capital over the last 20 years.
While simulation studies of stylized economies, such as Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) , have shown that policy-induced general equilibrium changes in factor prices occur slowly over time, they have also demonstrated that such changes can be of fitst-order importance in redistributing across generations. Thus, if one were able to factor in these feedback effects reliably, the difference in the treatment of today's elderly versus today's children would likely be greatly accentuated.
V. Conclusion
This paper has examined a variety of evidence, all of which points to a deterioration in the standard of living of American children relative to adults, particularly the current elderly. Our findings indicate a rapid increase in the lifetime net tax rates of Americans born over the course of this century. Those born at the turn of the century can expect to pay just over a fifth of their lifetime income to the government; for those born at the beginning of the next century, that figure is likely to swell to well over one-half.
Does this considerable disparity in the lifetime net tax rates of different generations imply that U.S. fiscal policy is generationally unsound? The answer depends on society's notion of generational equity, on how the special contributions of particular generations are assessed, and on the level of benefits being provided to different generations as a result of the government's purchases of goods and services. If society believes that generational equity entails, other things being equal, the same proportional net tax sacrifice from each generation, then there is no question that the federal government's treatment of today's and tomorrow's children relative to the current elderly is highly inequitable.
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